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Sentencing the killers of gay men since the abolition 
of provocation in New Zealand: have the courts 
reflected community concerns? 
 
 
 
This paper discusses sentencing in New Zealand homicide cases in which the offence 
was prompted by a homosexual advance in light of the abolition of the partial defence 
of provocation. The author argues that, despite the concerns around sentencing in 
homosexual advance cases that partly led to the abolition of the partial defence, there 
has been no real change in the way these cases are being sentenced. This paper 
suggests that prejudice against homosexuals may be a significant contributing factor 
toward the low sentences that have continued to be given to offenders in unwanted 
homosexual advance cases. 
 
Key words: Sentencing, homosexual advance, provocation, abolition 
 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
 
In 2007 Ronald Brown was viciously beaten in his home and left to die with the 
broken neck of a banjo pushed into his mouth. 1  His killer, Hungarian tourist 
Ferdinand Ambach, argued that Brown provoked his own death with a brief, non-
violent sexual advance towards Ambach. The jury in this case accepted his 
explanation. Ambach was found not guilty of murder, and was eventually sentenced 
to 12 years imprisonment for manslaughter. Even though Ambach intended to kill 
Brown, he was not sentenced to life imprisonment due to Brown’s alleged conduct, 
which many would not consider to be a sufficient explanation for homicidal loss of 
self-control. 
                                                        
1 R v Ambach HC Auckland CRI-2007-004-27374, 18 September 2009. 
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Partly in response to public disquiet about the use of the defence, 2 New Zealand 
Parliament abolished the partial defence of provocation in 2009. This defence 
operated to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter in cases where the offender 
was provoked in a manner sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self-control, and 
it was this provocation that induced the offender to commit the act of homicide. While 
the Law Commission had previously recommended abolition of the defence in New 
Zealand on more than one occasion,3 it was the 2008 case of R v Weatherston that 
brought the issues surrounding provocation into the public eye.4 The potential use of 
the defence by Weatherston sparked public outrage, as it was seen as inappropriate 
victim blaming.5  
 
The defence also gained public notoriety due to its successful use in homicide cases 
that involved an unwanted, non-violent, homosexual advance by the victim. It was 
argued, often successfully, that this type of advance constituted severe provocation 
justifying a homicidal loss of self-control in the ordinary person. Many argued that 
the use of provocation in these cases was discriminatory against the homosexual 
community.6 
 
This paper will first discuss the partial defence of provocation and some of the 
arguments that were used to support the case for abolition. It will outline why the 
                                                        
2 Elisabeth McDonald “Provoking Law Reform: Feminism, Queer Theory and the Legislative Agenda” 
in Claire Chambers and Dean Knight (eds) We the People(s) (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 
2011) 237 at 243. 
3 New Zealand Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation, (‘The Partial Defence of 
Provocation’) (NZLC R98, Wellington, 2007), New Zealand Law Commission Some 
Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R 73, Wellington, 2001).  
4 R v Weatherston [2011] NZCA 276.  
5 Edward Gay “Partial defence of provocation set to be dumped” The New Zealand Herald 
<nzherald.co.nz>. 
6 Alison Laurie “’Homosexual Panic’ defence must go” The New Zealand Herald 
<www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
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partial defence was eventually abolished, including the role of the Law Commission’s 
2007 Report The Partial Defence of Provocation (“the Report”) in that process. The 
focus will be on the use of provocation in unwanted homosexual advance cases, with 
discussion centering on why there was such opposition to the use of the partial 
defence in these cases. It will consider how the use of the defence of provocation 
worked in favour of heterosexual men, and how it operated to legitimise violence 
against homosexual men. 
 
In considering the event that provocation was to be abolished, the Law Commission 
acknowledged that steps would need to be taken to ensure that relevant provocation 
by victims would be taken into account in appropriate cases. Following abolition, the 
Law Commission suggested that judges should consider the effect of alleged 
provocation at sentencing stage.7 The effect of the abolition of the partial defence of 
provocation was therefore to shift the focus away from the jury and onto the role of 
the sentencing judges. This means that the burden now lies solely on judges to 
acknowledge the relevant issues at sentencing stage.  
 
The Report found that a significant proportion of all successful provocation cases 
involved an unwanted homosexual advance.8 This paper will look at some of these 
cases in detail, and will compare the sentences given with those in similar, post-
abolition cases.  It will show that, despite the change in law, sentencing in these cases 
remains largely unchanged. This paper suggests that this may be because, while 
provocation must be of a high level to reduce a murder sentence from life 
imprisonment, provocative actions of the victim may still substantially reduce a 
                                                        
7 The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 3, at [183]. 
8 At [102]. 
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sentence where the charge is found to be manslaughter; suggesting that sympathy for 
an offender who has experienced an unwanted homosexual advance is still able to 
significantly affect the way a judge or jury decides in homosexual advance cases.  
 
This paper will argue that one of the issues that should be being addressed in the 
aforementioned cases is whether a crime has been committed because of a 
homophobic motivation. This is an aggravating factor under s 9(1)(h) of the 
Sentencing Act 2002. This paper discusses the previous tension between provocation 
and s 9(1)(h), and how abolition of the partial defence has removed any cause for a 
sentencing judge to be reluctant to recognise a homosexual advance homicide as a 
hate crime. It will consider the lack of recognition of this section in such cases since 
abolition, and what could be done to ensure that this aggravating factor is given 
appropriate consideration.  
 
This paper will then discuss one of the Law Commission’s recommendations, which 
was to establish a Sentencing Council to provide guidance to sentencing judges.9 A 
Sentencing Council may have been effective in ensuring that s 9(1)(h) was considered 
in relevant homosexual advance cases. The introduction of a Sentencing Council 
would also have addressed the concerns of some groups who did not initially support 
abolition of the defence of provocation, such as Women’s Refuge, on the basis that 
this would be a method of ensuring community input into the identification of 
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. However, a Sentencing Council was not 
established. This paper argues that the failure to create any sort of guidance for 
sentencing judges has left a void in terms of cases involving alleged provocation by 
                                                        
9 The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 3, at [205]. 
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the victim. It concludes by arguing that the failure to establish a Sentencing Council, 
as recommended, has meant that community concerns about the kinds of excuses 
offered for killing gay men, which were validated through the successful use of the 
defence of provocation, remain.  
 
II Reasons for the Abolition of the Partial Defence of Provocation 
 
The partial defence of provocation was contained in s 169 of the Crimes Act 1961. In 
homicide cases where there had been provocation by the victim, the defence could be 
used to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter. Section 169 required that the 
offender had been provoked to such an extent that it was sufficient to deprive a person 
having the self-control of an ordinary person, but otherwise the characteristics of the 
offender, of the power of self-control. It then had to be shown that it was this loss of 
self-control that caused the offender to kill their victim. The judge would decide 
whether or not the defence should be put to the jury as a matter of law, and it was then 
left to the jury to determine that the prosecution had not disproved the availability of 
the partial defence beyond reasonable doubt, in order for manslaughter to be the 
verdict.  
 
Historically, provocation was used to reduce charges for offences which society felt 
carried lowered culpability. This was because, as the victim either instigated the 
conflict or did something to wrong the offender, there was therefore a moral wrong by 
both parties.10  The partial defence implied that while it may not be morally right to 
kill somebody for their provoking action, a person is in some way excused for taking 
                                                        
10 A J Ashworth “The Doctrine of Provocation” (1976) 35 Cambridge LJ 292 at 307. 
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punitive action against someone who has intentionally caused great moral offence.11 
When a legal system requires that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment be given 
for murder, overly harsh sentencing may occur in some cases. Where the offender 
truly lost the power of self-control due to the provocative action of the victim, the 
existence of the partial defence may be justified to ensure that a sentence lower than 
life imprisonment, which is more reflective of the offender’s culpability, may be 
imposed. 
 
Until the passing of the Sentencing Act 2002, there was a mandatory life 
imprisonment for murder. Now s 102 of the Act provides for a presumption of life 
imprisonment for murder, which can be rebutted where such a sentence would be 
“manifestly unjust”.12 This means that the circumstances of the offence, including the 
actions of the victim, may be taken into account at sentencing stage, and may rebut 
the presumption of life imprisonment if appropriate. As this allows for some 
discretion in the sentencing of murders, the partial defence of provocation was no 
longer a crucial part of New Zealand’s law, with regard to the recognition of 
decreased culpability. 
 
The Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Act was passed in December 2009. The defence of 
provocation could no longer be relied on for homicides committed after the Act came 
into force. There had been much discussion about the flaws of the defence and 
inconsistencies in the way it had been applied leading up to the abolition, as well as 
concerns expressed regarding how the courts would adjust sentencing without the 
defence.  
                                                        
11 At 307. 
12 The Sentencing Act 2002, s102. 
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The Law Commission’s 2007 Report detailed the reasons in support of their 
recommendation to abolish the defence of provocation. One reason was the 
conceptual flaw in the partial defence identified by the Law Commission; uncertainty 
of whether or not there is actually such a thing as loss of self-control. It is not clear 
that this phenomenon genuinely exists.13 It has been suggested that self-control is 
actually moderated by reason.14 The law has no way of determining scientifically 
whether the behavior of a defendant was simply due to extreme anger giving way to 
uncontrolled behavior, or a genuine pathological impulse which the defendant truly 
could not control.15   
 
Even if loss of self-control does exist, it is argued that the ordinary (reasonable) 
person would not be susceptible to it, and certainly not to loss of self-control so 
extreme as to result in homicide. The Law Commission reasoned that this is not an 
experience that an ordinary person would have, that only the most extraordinary 
person would react in this way.16 The Report states that this is the defence’s “most 
telling flaw”.17  
 
If loss of self-control does not truly exist, then the partial defence was essentially 
being used to inappropriately excuse those offenders who lashed out in a homicidal 
rage. There were concerns that the defence was based on “archaic notions about 
                                                        
13 At [88]. 
14 At [88]. 
15 Warren J Brookbanks “‘I lost it’ - rage and other excuses: rethinking loss of self-control in 
provocation” (2006) 31 Alt LJ 186 at 187. 
16 At [89]. 
17 At [89]. 
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violence”, and that society no longer accepted an affront to dignity as a reasonable 
excuse for homicidal anger.18 
 
The flawed concept behind provocation was not the only problem with the partial 
defence. Practically, it was also extremely complicated for juries to consider, despite 
the extensive directions they were given. These directions were that the defendant’s 
characteristics could be considered in light of the gravity of provocation, but they 
could not be considered in regard to the defendant’s ability to exercise self-control.19 
The correctness of this approach caused much debate, as it seems that any 
characteristics that would affect how strongly a defendant felt the provocation would 
also be significant when considering the ability of a defendant to exercise self-
control.20 
 
Another way the partial defence appeared to be flawed in practice was that the 
defence was biased in favour of the interests of heterosexual men. The defence of 
provocation works to benefit heterosexual men by recognising what is dominantly a 
male reaction as mitigating their crime, but it works to the detriment of women, who 
rarely kill at all, comparatively speaking,21 but who are often the victims of such a 
provoked response. 22  It also works against homosexual men in that it has been 
repeatedly used in situations where heterosexual men have believed their masculinity 
to be “fundamentally threatened”. 23 This often refers to an unwanted homosexual 
                                                        
18 Gay, above n 5. 
19 The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 3, at [83]. 
20 At [83]. 
21 In 2012, of the 25 people convicted of murder, 2 were women <http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz> 
Statistic NZ Website. 
22 Joshua Dressler “When ‘Heterosexual’ Men Kill ‘Homosexual’ Men: Reflections on Provocation 
Law, Sexual Advances, and the ‘Reasonable Man’ Standard” (1995) 85 J Crim L & Crim 726 at 754. 
23 The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 3, at [96]. 
 11 
advance, which successful use of the partial defence affirmed is a situation in which 
the ordinary person would respond with rage and violence. 
 
The use of provocation in the context of an unwanted homosexual advance was very 
contentious because of the discriminatory way that it operated against homosexual 
men.24 The next section of this paper will discuss in more detail some of the issues 
surrounding the use of provocation in these types of cases. 
 
III  The Problematic Use of Provocation in Homosexual Advance 
Cases 
 
The use of the partial defence of provocation in circumstances of an alleged non-
violent unwanted homosexual advance was problematic for a number of reasons.  
 
The defence was often raised in cases where a man alleged to have felt so strongly 
about a sexual advance from another man that he lost the power of self-control, which 
caused him to kill his victim. Cases of this nature where provocation was successful 
did not necessarily involve violent or even aggressive sexual advances. Often a brief 
touch in an overly familiar way was all that had occurred to cause the offenders to 
allegedly lose power of self-control, which then caused them to kill their victims.  
 
The fact that a loss of self-control leading to homicidal violence was deemed to be a 
reaction of the “ordinary person” under the requirements of the defence implied that 
homophobia is an acceptable trait, and one that others can and should feel sympathy 
                                                        
24 The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 3, at [96]. 
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for. 25  The use of provocation in homosexual advance situations protected a 
heterocentric view of masculinity that promotes the notion that violence against 
homosexual men is acceptable in order to affirm the masculinity of the offender.26 
 
By upholding this view of masculinity, successful use of provocation in unwanted 
homosexual advance cases affirmed the idea that violent reactions to gay men were 
justifiable and understandable. As Gary Comstock points out, females are often 
subjected to the sorts of advances that are argued to have caused murderous outrage in 
some homosexual advance cases.27 It seems very unlikely that a jury would find, for 
example, that a man placing his hand upon the leg of a woman would be an 
acceptable excuse for the woman to lash out in homicidal rage and kill him. The fact 
of the victims’ homosexuality was the additional element that distinguished 
homosexual advance cases from other types of sexual advances that would almost 
certainly not have fulfilled the requirements of s 169.  By allowing these non-violent 
unwanted homosexual advances to be considered by the jury as a feasible class of 
provocation, judges were allowing and even encouraging homophobia and excusing 
disproportionate violence against gay men.28 
 
Robert B Mison discusses society’s deeply engrained homophobia, and says that 
this heterosexism and disapproval of homosexuality are beliefs so much a part of 
culture they are not experienced explicitly. Instead they seem part of the 
                                                        
25 New Zealand Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 3, at [96]. 
26 Antony Whitehead "Man to Man Violence: How Masculinity May Work as a Dynamic Risk Factor" 
(2005) 44 How J Crim Just 411 at  417. 
27 Gary Comstock “Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense” (1992) Law and Sexuality 81 at 100. 
28 Adrian Howe “More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise (Homophobic Violence and Sexed Excuses – 
Rejoining the Provocation Law Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual Advance Defence)” (1997) 19 
Sydney LR 336 at 340. 
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individual’s rational ordering of their perceptions of their world.29 He argues that 
the use of provocation in unwanted homosexual advance cases is a judicial 
affirmation and legitimisation of society’s homophobia. 30  The defence allowed 
juries to express their homophobia through a legitimate channel. Juries may 
unconsciously pass negative social judgment on the victim’s homosexuality, and 
therefore the defence of provocation may seem a natural way to express their 
disapproval.31 
 
The abolition of the partial defence of provocation was a necessary step away from 
this legal affirmation that homophobia was normal and acceptable. However, relevant 
provocation issues still need to be considered in appropriate cases. The next section of 
this paper will consider what was recommended in terms of dealing with provocation 
post abolition. 
 
IV Provocation as an Issue for Sentencing Judges  
 
As mentioned previously, the abolition of the partial defence of provocation meant 
that factors that could previously have reduced a conviction of murder to 
manslaughter would now be taken into account at sentencing stage.32 
 
The Law Commission’s 2007 Report addressed some of the concerns that had arisen 
regarding sentencing upon abolition of the defence.  
                                                        
29 Robert Mison "Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as 
Insufficient Provocation" (1992) 80 Cal LR 133 at 177. 
30 At 177. 
31 Christina Pei-Lin Chen "Provocation's Privileged Desire: The Provocation 
Doctrine, 'Homosexual Panic', and the Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual Advance" (2000) 10 
Cornell JL & Pub Pol 195 at 212. 
32 At [184]. 
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One of the concerns discussed in the Report was the fact that there may be less 
transparency if the relevant arguments were dealt with at sentencing stage. However, 
the Law Commission argued that consideration of provocation at sentencing would 
actually lead to greater transparency. This is because judges are required to state their 
reasoning for the aggravating and mitigating factors considered in open court, which 
is in contrast with cases where provocation did not succeed with a jury, whose 
deliberations are private, so very little would be articulated about the issues involved 
and how they were dealt with.33  
 
In cases prior to abolition, when provocation was put to the jury alongside other 
partial defences such as lack of intent, it was impossible to know which defence was 
the basis for a conviction of manslaughter. In terms of homosexual advance cases, the 
requirement that judges deal with provocation issues at sentencing had the potential to 
be a positive shift in regard to transparency. If a judge considers a homosexual 
advance to be a significant mitigating factor, this must be stated. The factors that 
aggravate or mitigate a sentence are open to public critique and judicial review if 
taken on appeal. This removes the secrecy around sentencing in homosexual advance 
cases, and therefore may discourage judges from sentencing these offenders based on 
prejudice against homosexuals. 
 
Another matter discussed in the Report was that defendants who would previously 
have succeeded with the defence of provocation would be at risk of harsher sentences 
upon repeal of s 169.  
                                                        
33 At [187]. 
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The Report considered the idea that, in order to amend the issue of harsher 
sentencing, measures may have been required to ensure that adequate consideration of 
mitigating factors was given at sentencing.34 The possible modification of s 102 of the 
Sentencing Act 2002 to ensure that this consideration occurred was discussed in the 
Report. This section permits a defendant to be given a lower sentence if to impose life 
imprisonment in the particular circumstances of the case would be manifestly unjust. 
The case of R v Rapira stated that this is a high threshold test, and would be met in 
exceptional cases only.35 One of the suggestions given was to lower the threshold 
from manifestly unjust to some lesser threshold to weaken the presumption of life 
imprisonment. However, this had the potential to be problematic in that it could 
undermine the important message that life imprisonment is the norm for intentional 
killing.36 The Report found that the current test for manifest injustice is arguably 
flexible enough to allow existing substantial mitigating factors to rebut the 
presumption in deserving cases.37 The Court of Appeal case of R v Hamidazeh has 
since confirmed that high-level provocation may be a relevant factor under s 102.38 
 
Another suggestion was to include in s 102 examples of the principal types of 
mitigation that are likely to rebut the presumption.39 However, as the complexities of 
proving provocation at trial caused substantial difficulty, it was thought that to add 
this type of specific guideline would be extremely difficult to accomplish without 
introducing the same problems that arose with the specifics of the partial defence.40 
 
                                                        
34 At [195]. 
35 R v Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794 at [121]. 
36 At [200]. 
37 At [200]. 
38 Hamidzadeh v R [2012] NZCA 550. 
39 At [201]. 
40 At [202]. 
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The Law Commission ultimately looked to the policy reason for abolition, which was 
that the defendants who successfully relied on provocation were not necessarily more 
deserving of favourable treatment than others who were convicted of murder. They 
found that it would therefore not make sense to continue to ensure that lower 
sentences are given to those defendants following the abolition of the defence, unless 
they meet the already established manifestly unjust test. 41  The Law Commission 
recommended therefore that no changes be made to the Sentencing Act 2002, and 
upon abolition no amendments were made to accommodate defendants who may 
previously have succeeded under s 169.  
 
A    After Abolition: The Court of Appeal Guideline Judgment - Hamidzadeh v R  
 
In Hamidzadeh v R, the Court of Appeal comprehensively considered when 
provocative conduct should be taken into account to meet the manifest injustice 
threshold in murder cases. The Court recognised that principles of sentencing were 
less relevant in murder cases where there is a specific sentencing regime in place. 
However, they found that one sentencing principle of particular relevance in murder 
cases was the degree of culpability of the offender, which is set out in s 8(a) of the 
Sentencing Act 2002. 42  
 
The Court found that loss of control might be a factor which is relevant to culpability, 
and that a killing which occurs due to a sudden and justified loss of self-control may 
be less culpable than one involving a calculated and controlled response.43 The Court 
stated that the approach to provocation sentencing should be fact-dependent, and they 
                                                        
41 At [196]. 
42 At [53] per Randerson J. 
43 At [60] per Randerson J. 
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stressed that a flexible approach is required.44 While the Judges felt that attempting to 
set out an exhaustive list of relevant considerations should be avoided, they did 
include some factors that may be relevant in provocation cases.45 These included the 
nature, duration and gravity of the alleged provocative conduct; the timing of any 
response by the offender; whether the response was proportionate to the nature, 
duration and gravity of the provocation; whether the provocation was (or remained) 
an operative cause of the offender’s response; and whether the provocative conduct 
was such as to reduce the offender’s culpability in all the circumstances.46 
 
The Court of Appeal stated that as well as applying the principles in s 8 of the 
Sentencing Act, a court should also apply the aggravating and mitigating factors in ss 
9 and 10.47 Provocation may be a relevant consideration under s 9(2)(c), which states 
that the conduct of the victim may be a mitigating factor. Despite the consideration of 
these sections, the Court was careful to note that provocation will not warrant a 
sentence of less than life imprisonment other than in exceptional circumstances.48 The 
Court stated that the requirement in murder cases to demonstrate manifest injustice 
must be kept firmly in mind, and that a high level of provocation will ordinarily be 
required to warrant the imposition of something less than life imprisonment under s 
102.49 This high level test means that the type of non-violent provocation previously 
argued successfully in homosexual advance cases would hopefully not be enough to 
rebut the presumption of life imprisonment.  
  
                                                        
44 At [62] per Randerson J. 
45 At [62] per Randerson J. 
46 At [62] per Randerson J. 
47 At [72] per Randerson J. 
48 At [72] per Randerson J. 
49 At [62] per Randerson J. 
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This judgment is helpful as a general guide for sentencing judges in provocation cases 
post abolition. However, in terms of homosexual advance cases, more specific 
guidance is still needed in order for sentencing to reflect community concerns around 
the sentencing of offenders in these cases. This is because, although in murder cases 
the threshold to rebut the presumption of life imprisonment is set at a high level, 
where the verdict of the court is manslaughter, there is no such guidance for how 
provocation may affect the sentence. Manslaughter sentences vary enormously, and 
there is a wide scope for provocation to be given very significant weight in the 
sentencing of manslaughter cases.  
 
The following comparison of cases from before and after the abolition of the defence 
of provocation shows that, despite the repeal of s 169, there has so far been no real 
change in the end result of sentences imposed in homosexual advance cases. Although 
provocation may only rebut the presumption of life imprisonment for murder where 
the provocation is of a high level, other issues now arise in terms of how alleged 
provocation may implicitly affect sentencing. 
 
V Case Comparison: Has Anything Changed Since Provocation was 
Abolished? 
 
A   Sentencing in Cases of a Manslaughter Verdict 
 
This section will compare sentencing in two unwanted homosexual advance cases, 
one that occurred before and one after the abolition of the partial defence of 
provocation. Both of these cases resulted in a manslaughter verdict. The purpose of 
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this comparison of cases is to determine whether community concerns regarding the 
excusing of violence in homosexual advance cases have been adequately addressed by 
the abolition of the defence of provocation.  
 
In 2003, 16 year old Amsheen Ali killed his uncle by marriage, Colin Hart by 
stabbing him in the chest, neck and back. Ali alleged that Hart had made a sexual 
advance toward him by rubbing his thighs and attempting to kiss his neck.50 Ali had 
previously put a knife in the couch, which after the advance he took out and stabbed 
Hart with five times. He then left the house, taking with him Hart’s wallet, credit 
cards and car keys, before returning to retrieve the knife he had used. He then drove 
around for the next few hours in Hart’s car with his friends. He told these friends 
about the killing, but made no mention of a homosexual advance of any kind.51 In 
court it was submitted that Ali’s casual reaction following the attack was not callous 
indifference as it may have appeared, but rather shock-induced denial.52  
 
Williams J directed the jury that the partial defence of provocation was available as a 
matter of law, as a homosexual assault might be met with feelings of revulsion that 
could lead the ordinary person to a loss of self-control.53 It was found that Hart’s 
advance provoked Ali to such an extent that would cause the ordinary person to lose 
the power of self-control, and Ali was therefore convicted of manslaughter but not 
murder. Williams J concluded his sentencing comments by expressing his sympathy 
for Ali’s family, and his hope for their continued support of Amsheen.54 Williams J’s 
sentencing judgment is telling in that it shows that the Judge considered Ali to be not 
                                                        
50 R v Ali CRI2003-292-1224, 19 August 2004, at [4] per Williams J. 
51 At [8] per Williams J. 
52 At [13] per Williams J. 
53 R v Ali & Nadan CRI-2003-292-1224, 22 July 2004 at [38] per Williams J. 
54 R v Ali, above n 52 at [21] per Williams J. 
 20 
only an offender in this case, but also a victim. He was openly sympathetic about the 
non-violent, but “repulsive” homosexual advance that Ali experienced. Ali was 
sentenced to only three years imprisonment for his crime.55 
 
The 2011 case of R v Ahsee is a case that has occurred since the abolition of the 
defence of provocation. It involved the killing of 59 year old Denis Phillips by Willie 
Ahsee, a 16 year old who Phillips had known for a few weeks, and who had 
previously visited his home to do boxing and weight training. 56  Ahsee went to 
Phillips’ house on the night of the incident, and again did some training with Phillips. 
The two men then began to drink wine and spirits together, and they both became 
very intoxicated. During the night, Phillips allegedly touched Ahsee on the upper 
thigh, and then a while later again touched him on his ear. Ahsee reacted by grabbing 
a serrated knife, and stabbing Phillips several times in the chest and neck. He later 
said that he did not mean to hit Phillips; he simply wanted to get him “out of the 
way”.57 He then left the house, taking with him Phillips’ laptop, cellphone and several 
items of his clothing. Ahsee was described as being highly distressed after the 
incident, and he confessed what he had done to police the next day.  
 
Ahsee defended his acts on the basis of the defence of accident, self-defence and the 
partial defence of lack of murderous intent. The jury found him to be guilty of 
manslaughter, which means that while they did not accept the defences of accident or 
self-defence as being met, they must have still found that he lacked murderous intent 
when he repeatedly stabbed Phillips.58  
                                                        
55 R v Ali, above n 50 at [20] per Williams J. 
56 R v Ahsee, CRI-2010-055-2018, 15 December 2011 at [4] per Asher J. 
57 At [16] per Asher J. 
58 At [15] per Asher J. 
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At sentencing, Asher J stated that, as Ahsee was not a homosexual he therefore would 
have found the advance “very difficult to deal with”. 59  He found that the sexual 
advance was to be considered as a significant mitigating factor, along with his youth 
and remorse. The aggravating factors included the use of a weapon, the extreme 
violence, and the harm that was done. Ahsee was sentenced to only five years 
imprisonment. 
 
These cases have elements that are remarkably similar, and so comparison is easily 
done. The judge in both cases expressed sympathy for the young offender who had 
experienced an unwanted homosexual advance. Both juries found that the offenders’ 
culpability was lower than for murder, despite the offenders having stabbed their 
victims multiple times in a way that is difficult to see as other than intentional. The 
low sentences given of three and five years show that, despite the abolition of 
provocation, the concerns around sentencing in homosexual advance cases remain.  
 
These cases illustrate that there has not been the change in sentencing in homosexual 
advance cases that advocates for the abolition of the partial defence of provocation 
hoped for. While provocation can no longer mitigate a sentence from murder to 
manslaughter, abolition seems to have raised other issues in regard to sentencing.  
Where an offender is found guilty of murder, Hamizadeh tells us that provocation can 
rebut the presumption of life imprisonment only where it is of a very high level. As 
the cases above show, these homosexual advance cases usually involve a brief 
unwanted touch, which is unlikely to be of the required gravity to rebut the 
                                                        
59 At [27] per Asher J. 
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presumption. It therefore seemed hopeful that after the abolition of provocation, this 
type of very low sentencing for homosexual advance cases would not be possible.  
 
However, while provocation may not ordinarily be enough to rebut the presumption 
of life imprisonment for murder, as the case of Ahsee shows, there is still the 
possibility that a homosexual advance by a victim may be considered to lower an 
offender’s culpability considerably, despite the offender no longer being able to rely 
on the partial defence of provocation. This is shown through the sentencing comments 
by the judge in Ahsee, but also possibly through the decision of the jury who found 
Ahsee to be guilty of manslaughter. Lack of intent is a confusing conclusion for the 
jury to have reached, considering Ahsee’s act of repeatedly stabbing Phillips with a 
knife. It is my submission that it may have been that, despite no longer having the 
partial defence of provocation available to them, the jury was nonetheless looking for 
a reason to acknowledge the homosexual advance as lowering Ahsee’s culpability, 
and that this was the true reason for the manslaughter conviction that was given. 
 
VI  Section 9(1)(h): How Hate Crime Legislation Fits in with 
Homosexual Advance Cases 
 
The above case comparison focused on the fact that homosexual advances have been 
wrongly used to mitigate an offender’s sentence by judges and juries. However, this 
paper will also argue that if the motivation for a homicide is a non-violent 
homosexual advance, it should be recognised as a hate crime, and taken into account 
as an aggravating factor under New Zealand’s hate crime legislation, s 9(1)(h) of the 
Sentencing Act 2002. 
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Section 9(1)(h) states that if an offender committed an offence partly or wholly 
because of hostility towards a group of persons who have an enduring common 
characteristic such as race, colour, nationality, religion, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, age, or disability, a sentencing judge must take this into account.60 This 
section is aimed towards recognition of hate crimes, and acknowleges that if the 
motivation of a crime is based on discrimination, it should aggravate the sentence 
given to the offender.61 The case of Taueki confirmed that this section includes 
where an offence has been committed partly or wholly because of homophobia.62  
 
A   The Tension Between s 9(1)(h) and the Partial Defence of Provocation in 
Homosexual Advance Cases 
 
Before the abolition of provocation, the use of s 9(1)(h) in unwanted homosexual 
advance cases was arguably at odds with the operation of the partial defence.63 This 
was because on one hand, the fact that the homicidal reaction was due to a 
homosexual advance could be used as a mitigatory factor, yet on the other, 
discriminatory behaviour based on prejudice toward homosexuals was to be 
considered as an aggravating factor of an offence.  
 
This meant that in homosexual advance cases where the defence of provocation 
was put to the jury, it may have seemed contradictory for a judge to then also 
                                                        
60 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(1)(h). 
61 John Ip “Debating New Zealand’s Hate Crime Legislation: Theory and Practice” (2005) 21 NZULR 
575 at 575. 
62 R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 at [31]. 
63 Elisabeth McDonald “No Straight Answer: Homophobia as Both an Aggravating and Mitigating 
Factor in New Zealand Homicide Cases” (2006) 37 VUWLR 223 at 247. 
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consider the homophobic motivation of the killing as an aggravating factor. By 
allowing both provocation and s 9(1)(h) to exist alongside each other in the same 
legal system, the New Zealand legislature was sending a confusing message about 
the tolerance of homophobically motivated hate-crimes. 64 The intended deterrence 
effect of s 9(1)(h) was being undermined by the legal legitimisation of homophobic 
violence through the allowance of the homosexual advance defence. 
 
It is submitted that since the abolition of the partial defence of provocation, there is 
no longer any reason why s 9(1)(h) should not be considered at sentencing in all 
relevant cases where a crime is motivated by homophobia.  
 
B   Why s 9(1)(h) is Important in Homosexual Advance Cases 
 
As the case comparison above shows, no longer allowing provocation to be used in 
unwanted homosexual advance cases may not on its own be effective in changing 
the way these cases are sentenced. The homophobic nature of these crimes must 
also be addressed and denounced by judges when they arise.   
 
In homicide cases where there has been an alleged homosexual advance, it is 
extremely important that this section is taken into account at sentencing.  A man 
killing another man due to a non-violent sexual advance is a crime that is 
committed because of hostility towards homosexuals. Rather than being viewed as 
an advance which could be refused in a non-violent manner, the homosexual nature 
                                                        
64 Scott D McCoy “Homosexual-Advance Defence and Hate Crime Statutes: Their Interaction and 
Conflict” (2001) 22 Cardozo LR 629 at 633. 
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of the advance means that it is automatically viewed by the heterosexual man as an 
assault.65  
 
This previously accepted attitude that a homosexual advance is so horrifying an 
experience for a straight man that he is justified in killing because of it must be 
altered. Recognition of this type of crime as a hate crime through the use of s 
9(1)(h) is an important step in this adjustment away from the acceptance of 
violence against homosexuals.  
 
However, the Judge in Ahsee did not consider s 9(1)(h) when sentencing the 
offender, showing that the judge did not consider the attack to be a crime 
committed by the Ahsee because of the victim’s homosexuality. It is difficult to see 
how this conclusion could have been reached based on the disparity between the 
non-violent provocative conduct, which seemingly required no more than an 
assertion that it was not wanted, and the violent death of the victim. Mr Phillips’ 
death should have been expressly recognised as a hate crime if the aggravating 
considerations set out in the Sentencing Act had been correctly applied. Despite the 
repeal of s 169 and therefore the elimination of the contradiction between the 
partial defence and s 9(1)(h), sentencing judges in unwanted homosexual advance 
cases are continuing to ignore this compulsory consideration. This is further 
illustrated through another comparison of a pre- and post-abolition case, in which 
the verdict in the post-abolition case was murder. 
 
 
                                                        
65 Ben Golder ‘The Homosexual Advance Defence and the Law/Body Nexus: Towards a Poetics of 
Law Reform’ (2004) 11 E Law: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law at [35]. 
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VII Case Comparison: Sentencing in Cases of a Murder Conviction 
 
A homosexual advance case that occurred after the abolition of the defence of 
provocation is R v Knight, which can be compared with the previously mentioned pre-
abolition case of R v Ambach. 66  Ferdinand Ambach, a Hungarian man, was 
temporarily in New Zealand for a working holiday. In December 2007 he met his 
victim, Ronald Brown, in a bar in Onehunga, and was invited back to his house for 
drinks. Ambach claimed that while they were drinking, Brown made an advance by 
touching his thigh, which Ambach rejected. A short while later Brown made another 
advance; this time briefly touching Ambach’s groin through his clothing. Ambach 
was apparently so troubled by this advance that he viciously attacked Brown. He hit 
him over the head multiple times with a banjo, a dumbbell weight, and other weapons. 
Ambach left Brown struggling to breathe, with the neck of the banjo pushed into his 
mouth. He continued to ransack the house, throwing things out of the window and at 
the injured Brown, breaking many of his precious belongings. Brown died two days 
later from his injuries.  
 
At trial, the partial defences of provocation and lack of murderous intent were put to 
the jury on the basis of Brown’s non-violent sexual advances. The jury found that 
Ambach was deserving of a conviction of manslaughter rather than murder.67 The 
sentencing judge concluded that due to the prolonged and severe attack, the most 
likely basis for the jury’s finding of manslaughter was provocation. Ambach was 
sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 8 years. 
 
                                                        
66 R v Ambach CRI-2007-004-27374, 18 September 2009. 
67 At [12] per Winkelmann J. 
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In the 2012 case of R v Knight, 21 year old Morgan Knight was hitchhiking near 
Taupo when Mr Tunnicliffe, a 64 year old ACC beneficiary, stopped to give him a 
ride. He invited Knight back to his house for lunch and to earn some money trimming 
trees. Once there, the two men sat and talked in the living room until approximately 
1am, at which time Knight says that Tunnicliffe touched his penis through his 
trousers. Knight reacted by punching him in the head repeatedly, kicking him in the 
stomach and then, once Tunnicliffe was unconscious, stomping on his head.  
 
Toogood J recognised that this was an overreaction to a sexual overture, and that the 
brutality of the attack took him close to the 17 year minimum parole period set out in 
s 104 of the Sentencing Act. However, he found that mitigating factors such as 
Knight’s youth and remorse brought the appropriate minimum parole period down to 
ten years. The judge in this case did not expressly consider Tunnicliffe’s advance to 
be a mitigating factor in his sentencing comments, but he also did not consider s 
9(1)(h) to be a factor that should aggravate Knight’s sentence.68  
 
Knight’s homicidal reaction to a brief, non-violent homosexual advance strongly 
suggests that Tunnicliffe’s homosexuality was the reason for Knight’s hostility. This 
means that s 9(1)(h) should have been considered, and Mr Tunnicliffe’s death should 
have been given proper recognition as a hate crime. Ten years is the lowest possible 
minimum parole period that may be given for murder under s 103 of the Sentencing 
Act. The brutality of the violence inflicted by Knight in this case seems to point to a 
sentence closer to the 17 year minimum under s 104 as Toogood J originally stated, 
even after consideration of the mitigating factors discussed. Despite finding that 
                                                        
68 R v Knight [2012] NZHC 2866 at [7] per Toogood J. 
 28 
Knight was guilty of murder, the sentence given to him was only two years longer 
than the eight years imposed in the very similar pre-abolition case of Ambach. Again, 
I submit that it is plausible that the sexual advance by Tunnicliffe was the true reason 
for the imposition of a surprisingly low sentence, despite the inability of the defendant 
to argue provocation as a partial defence. 
 
If it is true that homosexual advances are still able to influence the decisions of judges 
and juries to the same effect as when the defence of provocation was available, then 
abolition has not been effective in addressing the concerns regarding sentencing in 
these cases. A homicidal reaction to an unwanted homosexual advance should not be 
excusable in any way.  
 
This unwillingness by judges to recognise the deaths of Mr Tunnicliffe and Mr 
Phillips as hate crimes deserving of more severe sentencing is disappointing. This 
paper suggests that one of the ways that this issue could have been addressed is 
through the establishment of a Sentencing Council, as recommended by the Law 
Commission in their 2007 Report. I will consider how a Sentencing Council could 
have made an important difference in terms of the use of s 9(1)(h), and to sentencing 
generally in homosexual advance cases. 
 
 
VIII  Sentencing Council 
 
The Sentencing Council Act was passed in 2007, and was to establish a Sentencing 
Council as an independent statutory body. The Sentencing Council’s principal 
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function would be to draft and declare sentencing guidelines for guidance of 
sentencing judges.69 Under the Act, the Sentencing Council was to be made up of four 
judicial members appointed by the relevant Heads of Bench, the chair of the Parole 
Board, and five non-judicial members appointed by the Governor-General on the 
recommendation of Parliament.70 
 
A court would have to impose a sentence that was consistent with any guidelines 
relevant to the case, unless satisfied it would be contrary to the interests of justice to 
do so. The Law Commission’s 2006 Report Sentencing Guidelines and Parole 
Reform found that there were marked inconsistencies in sentencing around New 
Zealand.71 One of the aims of the Sentencing Council Act was to achieve greater 
consistency in sentencing, which would mean more predictable outcomes.72  
 
Some felt that the creation of a sentencing council was a threat to judicial 
independence. In his lecture “Chipping away at the Judicial Arm”, John Priestly said 
that he thought that sentencing guidelines would have seriously restricted the 
discretion of sentencing judges to do justice in the wide range of cases over which 
they preside. He felt that the entire episode pointed to a tendency of Parliament to 
fetter the judicial arm.73 However the Report also asked whether it was any longer 
appropriate for sentencing policy to be left to the judiciary.74 The Law Commission 
stated that while the independence of judges in imposing impartial individual 
                                                        
69 New Zealand Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 3 at [188]. 
70 Warren Young and Andrea King “Sentencing Practice and Guidance in New Zealand” at 257. 
71 New Zealand Law Commission Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform, (NZLC R 94, 
Wellington, 2006) at [20].  
72 Young and King, above n 70 at 258. 
73 John Priestley “Chipping Away at the Judicial Arm?” (2009) 17 Waikato Law Review 1 at 21.  
74 At [43]. 
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sentences without influence from other branches of government is important, a 
democratically elected Government, who is in the position to take into account the 
concerns of the community, may more appropriately deal with the overarching 
policies under which sentences are imposed.75 The Law Commission suggested the 
establishment of a sentencing council as a possible way to allow more involved public 
debate and input into sentencing policy.76 This means that there would have been 
more scope for community input into the aggravating and mitigating factors to be 
addressed in particular types of cases, including homosexual advance cases. 
 
Graham Panckhurst stated that in order for the guidelines to be workable, they needed 
to be prescriptive enough to result in consistent sentencing, but that they also had to 
allow sufficient flexibility for judges to depart from the resulting sentence if they had 
compelling reasons to do so.77 If this had been achieved, judicial independence could 
have been maintained, and the Sentencing Council may have been able to succeed in 
ensuring greater consistency in sentencing. 
 
Guidelines from the Sentencing Council could have allowed for much more detail 
than it is possible to achieve through guidance provided by legislation. A three step 
analysis was suggested in the proposed guidelines.  This analysis required first that a 
judge first take into account the factual criminality of the offence, which would place 
the offence in the appropriate band of seriousness. The judge would then assess what 
point within this band best fits the culpability of the offender on a preliminary 
consideration, which would be the starting point for the sentence. Finally, the judge 
                                                        
75 At [43]. 
76 At [43]. 
77 Graham Pankhurst “A Sentencing Council, Enlightened or Folly?” (2008) 14 Canta LR 191 at 200 at 
204. 
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would consider the individual circumstances of the offender, which may adjust the 
sentence from the starting point either up or down.78 
 
Despite the Act having come into force, the National Government of the time, elected 
in 2008, indicated that it does not wish to proceed with sentencing guidelines. The 
Minister of Justice Simon Power stated that the National Government felt that a 
Sentencing Council was an extra layer of bureaucracy that was not needed.79 This is a 
disappointing outcome, as the guidance that a Sentencing Council would have 
provided could have been valuable for sentencing judges, particularly in dealing with 
homicide cases occurring after the abolition of provocation. This paper suggests that 
this applies particularly to homosexual advance cases, where there is a need for 
impartial sentencing that recognises the prejudiced motivation for these crimes, and 
reflects the concerns that surrounded the sentencing of these cases prior to the 
abolition of provocation. 
 
The Sentencing Council would have been able to provide guidelines for how a judge 
should deal with homosexual advance situations, including direction on what level of 
provocation may lead to a finding of manifest injustice, and what aggravating and 
mitigating factors should have been considered. The Council would also have been 
helpful in that it could have ensured that the discriminatory effect of the defence of 
provocation against homosexual men did not continue through sentencing despite the 
repeal of s 169. This could have been achieved by requiring that any crime committed 
due to homophobia be recognised as a hate crime under s 9(1)(h).  This mandatory 
recognition would then have ensured that an offender’s sentence was aggravated 
                                                        
78 Pankhurst, above n 77 at 203. 
79 Pankhurst, above n 77 at 204. 
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because of the hate crime status of the offence, which could have resulted in sentences 
more in line with community expectations in regard to the brutality of the violence 
inflicted.  
 
This paper has shown that in homosexual advance cases that occurred both before and 
after the abolition of the defence of provocation, sentencing judges have consistently 
neglected to acknowledge the homophobic nature of the crimes as an aggravating 
factor of the offence. Guidance as to what may constitute a hate crime would have 
been helpful in ensuring that the homophobic motivation of offenders in homosexual 
advance cases was not overlooked. 
 
IX Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that a man reacting in a homicidally violent manner when 
another man makes a non-violent sexual advance toward him is a homophobic 
response. Therefore, allowing the partial defence of provocation to categorise such a 
reaction as one of the ordinary person justifies of this type of homophobic violence. 
Because of this, the abolition of the partial defence of provocation was seemingly a 
positive event for the homosexual community of New Zealand, as it meant the 
defence of provocation could no longer be used as a way to normalise violence 
against homosexuals in the New Zealand courts. This paper discussed a sample of 
pre-abolition cases, which showed that this move against prejudice in homosexual 
advance cases was long overdue in the New Zealand legal system. 
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However, as the case comparison in this paper shows, the abolition of the partial 
defence of provocation has so far made no substantial difference to sentencing in 
homosexual advance cases. This paper suggests that prejudice against homosexuals is 
still able to affect the way judges and juries decide in these cases. Alleged provocative 
actions of the victim may still be the underlying basis for manslaughter verdicts that 
are difficult to reconcile with the violence of the offender, such as in Ahsee, or for the 
imposition of the lowest possible minimum period of imprisonment for murder, as 
was given in Knight.  
 
It is my view that this is because abolition of the partial defence was only one of the 
actions necessary to bring about the crucial change to the way these cases were being 
sentenced. Identification of these offences as hate crimes, and the recognition of that 
fact as an aggravating factor, is very important in denouncing violent reactions to 
homosexual advances or behaviour. However, sentencing judges in homosexual 
advance homicides have continued to overlook the relevance of s 9(1)(h) as an 
aggravating factor. 
 
In order for the abolition of the partial defence of provocation to have the intended 
positive effect, judges need much clearer guidance on how to sentence in provocation 
cases post-abolition. The Court of Appeal guidance judgment of R v Hamidzadeh set 
out basic principles for sentencing in post-abolition cases, but more specific guidance 
is needed for homosexual advance cases. As the Law Commission suggested, the 
establishment of a Sentencing Council could have been used to ensure that 
provocation was appropriately dealt with, and could also have allowed for community 
input into sentencing policy.  
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This paper argued that sentencing guidelines could have given more specific direction 
to sentencing judges in cases where provocation had allegedly been the cause of the 
offence. These guidelines would have been particularly helpful where the provocation 
being alleged was a homosexual advance. This is because guidelines could have been 
drafted to ensure that s 9(1)(h) was considered, and community concerns were 
addressed to ensure that more appropriate sentences were imposed upon the 
homophobic killers of gay men. If homosexual advance offenders continue to be 
given sentences that do not seem to fit their violent crimes, the legal legitimisation of 
violence against homosexual men endures. It is my submission that this problem 
needs to be addressed directly, and that this could have been done through sentencing 
guidelines that required recognition of these offences as hate crimes, and sentences 
appropriate for the level of violence inflicted. The decision not to establish a 
Sentencing Council has meant that judges in homosexual advance cases have been 
left without suitable guidance, and therefore the concerns surrounding sentencing in 
these cases remain. 
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